Crowdsourcing is an unique and practical approach to obtain personalized data and content. Its impact is especially significant in providing commentary, reviews and metadata, on a variety of location based services. In this study, we examine reliability of the Waze mapping service, and its vulnerability to a variety of locationbased attacks. Our goals are to understand the severity of the problem, shed light on the general problem of location and device authentication, and explore the efficacy of potential defenses. Our preliminary results already show that a single attacker with limited resources can cause havoc on Waze, producing "virtual" congestion and accidents, automatically re-routing user traffic, and compromising user privacy by tracking users' precise movements via software while staying undetected. To defend against these attacks, we propose a proximity-based Sybil detection method to filter out malicious devices.
INTRODUCTION
Waze is a popular crowdsourced mapping service with more than 50 million users across the globe as of June 2013 [3] . Waze enables its navigation and map services by leveraging crowdsourced data gathered from its large user community. First, by collecting the GPS information from all users' phones, Waze draws real-time traffic flow on the roads and provides traffic-aware routing service. Second, Waze users can report real-time alerts on their routes, ranging from accidents to road closures, hazards, traffic jams, and even police cars and speed traps. Posted alerts are visible to all nearby users. Waze also allows users to do traffic-aware route planning, and displays alerts along routes.
While crowdsourcing data is the key enabler of Waze service, the lack of verification and sanitization on this user generated data also makes Waze highly vulnerable to data manipulation. Today's mobile location data could be easily spoofed and there is no reliable, scalable mechanism to authenticate this data. An attacker could easily feed fake information into Waze's database and manipulate operations like routing. Taking this attack to a massive scale, emulation of large amount of mobile devices is possible using low cost emulators or even scripts. With only limited resources, an attacker Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). could produce an army of "virtual" Waze users and produce enough data to pollute or even take over Waze data in any desired area. We refer to these "virtual" devices as Sybil devices, using the analogy of Sybil users in Social Networks.
Fundamentally, Waze (along with other location-based services) suffer from the same challenge: the lack of authentication of location data or the existence of physical devices. Authentication of location information requires proof from physical world, which cannot be generated reliably and in large scale by existing mechanisms. Also, with no widely-available verifiable information on mobile devices, services cannot distinguish a real device with a software script.
Attacks on Crowdsourced Maps.
There are three primary attacks on crowdsourced mapping services like Waze 1 . First, an attacker can generate fake events, like accidents, construction, and speed traps. Second, an attacker can produce "virtual congestion" by reporting slow-moving GPS traces from a group of vehicles. Since an attacker can emulate a significant number of devices using software, tools like voting, consensus, and leader election can all be overcome by sheer numbers. Finally, a fake mobile user can "virtually" follow any individual user as long as their Waze application is active, even in the background. This presents the biggest risk to Waze users, as Waze locations can pinpoint users to within meters of their actual location.
Related Work.
Location verification is a known challenge for mobile systems. Attacks using forged GPS to cheat location services out of coupons or benefits have been studied in prior literature [2, 9] . Our previous work also explored how to use forged GPS to locate users in anonymous social networks [7] .
A number of technical solutions have been proposed to address the problem, but have made limited impact. Some have proposed using wireless infrastructure to generate location proofs [1, 4] , but requires infrastructure changes and provide rough location granularity. Others proposed leveraging Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) that can securely certify sensor data such as GPS [5] , but this requires tamperproof hardware and widespread adoption. Finally, others have proposed mutual location authentication signatures augmented by trusted centralized authorities [6] .
ATTACKS AND INITIAL EXPERIMENTS
There are two key mechanisms necessary to launch significant attacks against crowdsourced mapping services such as Waze. First, we need a way to automatically spoof and control the GPS data on devices running Waze. This is easily achieved using widely available Android phone emulators, many of which can be scripted and support external GPS input. Second, we need a way to scalably interact with the Waze server, to enable light-weight emulation of Waze app. This was made possible by launching man-in-themiddle attack between a self-controlled Waze app and the Waze server. It allows us to interpret Waze's APIs, filter our API calls for specific functionalities, and script simple Waze actions. As a result, we can "virtualize" Waze clients using scripts. Next, we describe our initial results of three major attacks on Waze.
Generating Fake Events.
We have confirmed that just a single mobile device can create arbitrary traffic events on Waze. While these events are removed after "invalidation" from other Waze users, this is easily overcome with the cooperation of multiple virtual devices under attacker's control. We validate this via experiments on a variety of unoccupied roads, including highways, local and rural roads.
Fake Traffic and Congestion.
A more serious attack on Waze targets specific users relying on Waze for real-time routing. Since Waze uses user's GPS to infer traffic condition and predict trip time to select optimal routes, an attacker could influence routing by generating traffic hotspots at specific locations. Fake traffic and congestion are created by reporting slow-moving GPS traces by multiple virtual devices. While better pruning and filtering on speed data could limit the impact of fake data, such mechanisms could be easily overwhelmed by a sufficient number of cooperating virtual devices.
Invasive User Tracking.
The most severe and worrisome attack is a tracking attack on targeted Waze users. Waze displays other nearby users' locations to increase user engagement and give users a sense of a larger community. Since virtual vehicle's location can be easily spoofed, we can remotely follow and track specific users. We replace Waze clients with low cost scripts to emulate large amount of virtual vehicles and overcome Waze's downsampling of nearby users. Given the accuracy of Waze reports of nearby users, this mechanism can be used to locate users within a small area. More importantly, an attacker tracking a user can do so while staying invisible, either by making requests to view users in remote areas, or by actually modifying its GPS to follow the user and move quickly out of range before detection.
We have performed initial validation of this attack by using virtual devices to track ourselves driving with a Waze-enabled phone. We were able to pinpoint our own phone to specific gas stations and parking lots, and also follow the target user as she moves. We performed the experiment in high traffic (and user density) areas, thus demonstrating that single users can be tracked even through crowded areas (Fig. 1) . Moreover, we did this experiment with only 20 Sybil devices, which further proves the severity of the tracking attack.
PROPOSED DEFENSE
Prior proposals for strong location authentication all require significant overhead in the form of hardware changes in infrastructure (wireless access points) or the mobile devices themselves (trusted hardware modules). Our approach to location authentication focuses on prioritizing practical mechanisms available today to achieve large scale and easy deployment.
Proximity-based Authentication. In a high level, our approach leverages the physical proximity between real devices to authenticate each other and propagate credibility. We bootstrap from an initial set of trusted users. When two devices come into proximity with each other, "trusted" user could propagate the credibility to the "untrusted" user by verifying each other via Waze. As trust propagate to the rest of users, we can detect Sybil devices using similar idea in community-based Sybil detection in social networks [8] . The intuition is Sybil devices are highly unlikely to come into physical proximity with real devices. There are very few "attack edges" between Sybil devices and real devices, hence Sybil devices form dense clusters away from normal users.
To bootstrap the initial set of trusted users, we assume that a number of infrastructure access points (and their IP addresses) are known to Waze servers. This is available today via public IP servers often used for user location by Apple and Google. Users who come into contact with known access points, or who join such networks, can be validated by a Waze app running in the background. As Waze can choose which access points to use for bootstrapping, it's very hard to attackers to guess the correct access point.
To verify the proximity of two devices, we are exploring the use of WiFi SSIDs as challenge-response mechanisms. By temporarily controlling the WiFi radio on one device, we can send beacons with a randomly generated, time-varying SSID provided by the Waze server. A second Waze device establishes a proximity edge to the first device by correctly returning the SSID value to the Waze server. To make trust propagate to Sybil devices, the attacker still needs to build "attack edges" with normal users. This requires the attacker to drive around and come into proximity with other users, which could become very costly.
Initial experiments show proximity authentication using WiFi SSID works well in both static and mobile (driving) environments. And Sybil devices could not easily evade detection without significant cost for building "attack edges" with normal users.
